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Chapter 9 – Reform  
 
The 1950s: the drive for reform 
Copyright committees 
In 1968, the Australian Parliament passed a new Copyright Act. The 
legislation implemented recommendations of the Spicer Committee, 
which examined options to reform the copyright law at the end of the 
1950s. The Committee, chaired by Justice John Spicer, took the British 
Copyright Act of 1956 “as the basis for our examination of the 
problems raised for our consideration”.1 Its report proposed that 
Australia substantively copy the British legislation.2  
Imitation did not mean commendation. The report pointed out several 
failings in the drafting and organisation of the British Act, echoing the 
criticisms of John Keating and Billy Hughes in the 1912 parliamentary 
copyright debates. Emulating Keating and Hughes, who found the 
skills of British parliamentary draftsmen wanting, the Committee 
praised the “superior” drafting of Commonwealth legislation since 
Federation. Conceptually, however, the Australian legislation owed 
everything to its British cousin.  
The British Act too resulted from an official inquiry. In 1951, the 
Board of Trade convened a committee to examine the legislative 
implications of dual subject matter: the revisions to the Berne  
Convention agreed in Brussels in 1948, and developments in 
broadcasting.3 The committee, chaired first by Lord Reading and then 
Sir Henry Gregory, reported in 1952.4  
                                                     
1 The Committee’s terms of reference were: “to examine the copyright law of 
Australia, and to advise which of the amendments recently made in the law of 
copyright in the United Kingdom should be incorporated into Australian copyright 
law and what other alterations or additions, if any, should be made to the copyright 
law of Australia.”  
2 Report of the Copyright Law Review Committee 1959, Commonwealth Government 
Printer 1960. 
3 The terms of reference for the Committee were: “[t]o consider and report 
whether any, and if so what, changes are desirable in the law relating to copyright in 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works with particular regard to technical 
developments and the revised International Convention for the Protection of 
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History repeated itself, for in 1909, the British Government also asked 
for expert advice on Convention revisions and the regulatory claims of 
a new industry. Like the Gorrell Committee 43 years earlier, the 
Gregory Committee recommended amendment of the British law 
consistent with the terms of the revised Convention and immediate 
subsequent ratification of the treaty. Unlike the Gorrell Committee, it 
did not equivocate when asked to endorse extension of copyright 
protection to an industry, in this case, the broadcasting industry. 
In Australia, history also repeated itself. Though legislators no longer 
felt obliged to draft legislation in conformity with British statutes, the 
Government followed the pattern of 1912.5 Legislators felt the suasion 
of the Berne Convention and, in practice, following the Convention 
meant following the British legislative model. Treaty obligations were 
sacred in Britain and Australia, and after Britain adopted the limited 
amendments to the Convention agreed at Brussels, Australia chose to 
do the same. 
The Gregory and Spicer committees did not hesitate to call for 
ratification of the amended Convention. They supported broadcast 
copyright but they wrestled with questions of logical justification. On 
what grounds could legislation intended to protect authors be expanded 
to include copyright in broadcasts? If arguments could be found to 
support a copyright never envisaged by the founders of the Berne 
Union, why not approve copyright in public performances? 
A new attitude 
The copyright committees of the 1950s differed in spirit from the 
Gorrell Committee. In 1909, committee members were guided by the 
doctrine of authors rights and most considered the compulsory 
recording licence an unwise concession to the gramophone industry. By 
the 1950s, officials thought differently. While the Gregory Committee 
regarded broadcast and recording copyright as “subsidiary” to authors’ 
                                                                                                           
Literary and Artistic Works signed at Brussels in June, 1948, and to consider and 
report on related matters.”  
4 Report of the Board of Trade Copyright Committee, London, HMSO, 1952 (the Gregory 
Committee Report).  
5 In 1931, the Statute of Westminster – accepted in Australian law in 1942 – provided 
that Britain could only legislate for the dominions at their request and with their 
assent. By the 1950s, the idea of imperial legislative unity was dead and the former 
dominions no longer adopted British imperial legislation.   
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rights, it advised the Government to pay heed to the interests of the 
industries responsible for the production and dissemination of 
copyright material. As early as page 3, the Gregory Report declared: 
There are, of course, trade interests. Indeed, the output of the United Kingdom 
publishing trade in 1951 has been estimated as being in the neighbourhood of £40 
million, of which probably slightly more than £12 m represents exports … Labour, 
skill and money have all gone to the making of the broadcast or gramophone  
record and we can see no justification for leaving the results of this combination open 
to piracy.  
Similarly, the Spicer Report, in discussing the merits of the mechanical 
performing right declared: 
We are of the view that the making of a record involves a considerable amount of 
artistic and technical skill … It certainly seems unjust that these [broadcasting] 
stations should profit by the artistic and technical skills of others without being 
required to make any payment other than the price of the record. 
The arguments of the later committees, which upheld the principles of 
the Berne Convention while proposing copyright in records, broadcasts 
and mechanical performances, never rose to heights of sophistication. 
Proponents, from Reginald Bonney at the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights, to Frederick Maugham in Cawardine and then the 
members of the Gregory and Spicer Committees, made the same 
essential point: productive industrial investment demands legal 
protection to prevent free riders from utilising the products of industry 
for profit. For the modern committees questions of legal principle were 
not paramount – principle must accommodate industrial need. 
Weaknesses of the copyright committees 
The Spicer Committee, and, to a lesser extent, the Gregory Committee, 
were dominated by lawyers. The Gregory Committee contained 
lawyers, a civil servant, a Fellow of the Royal Society, a Fellow of the 
Library Association and the barrister and legal scholar F E Skone 
James. The President of the Book Publishers’ Association and the 
Acting Director of the Melbourne Conservatorium of Music were 
members of the Spicer Committee but they bowed to the influence of 
two senior judges.  
Legalism and vested interest could not fail to influence the conclusions 
of each inquiry. Lord Gregory graduated in economics from the 
London School of Economics but he could not claim expertise in 
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analysis of the merits and function of regulation. He spent his civil 
service career administering laws controlling customs and excise, 
wartime logistics, enemy property and trade.  
Australia felt the problem of circumscribed analysis more acutely. 
British governments did not view copyright regulation as the exclusive 
province of the legal arm of government, and policy-makers evinced 
less devotion to legal norms and precedents than their Australian 
counterparts. The members of the Gregory Committee, for instance, 
were impressed by criticisms of the long posthumous term made by the 
economist Sir Arnold Plant, Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Commerce 
at the University of London.6 They recorded their favourable 
impression of his arguments though they stated that they were 
constrained from accepting his recommendations.  
The Australian committee displayed no such willingness to consider the 
intellectual merits of arguments that undermined the copyright faith. It 
consisted of two judges, John Spicer and Arthur Dean, a Melbourne 
solicitor, A J Moir, George Ferguson, a director of Angus and 
Robertson who was also President of the Book Publishers’ Association, 
and the Reverend Dr Percy Jones, the Acting Director of the 
Melbourne Conservatorium of Music. Leslie Zines, an officer of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department and later an eminent 
scholar of constitutional law, acted as secretary to the Committee. 
Spicer, the Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court and a 
former Commonwealth Attorney General led his Committee with 
vigour, but in technical legal matters he deferred to Dean, a judge of 
the Victorian Supreme Court. As Attorney, he appointed Dean to lead 
inquiries into the Australian patents and trademarks legislation and, 
Dean, an expert in industrial property, provided the Committee’s 
intellectual leadership.7 Together with Spicer, he controlled the 
                                                     
6 In “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books”, supra, Plant quoted David 
Hume who in 1771 wrote to his publisher, “I have heard you frequently say that no 
publisher would find profit in making an edition which would take more than three 
years in selling”. Plant proposed in the article a compulsory licence allowing book 
publishers to publish new editions of a published work five years after its first 
publication. 
7 In January 1958, the Commonwealth Attorney General wrote to his Victorian 
counterpart to explain the background to Dean’s appointment. After he chaired the 
patents and trademarks inquiries, the Government envisaged that Justice Dean 
would chair a copyright inquiry. When Dean went on leave in 1956, he spent some 
time in London familiarising himself with the pending British copyright legislation. 
However, on his return he expressed doubt as to whether he could combine his 
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Committee’s hearings, directed its analysis of evidence, and, ultimately, 
determined its conclusions. 
The Australian branch of PEN and the Australian Journalists’ 
Association both protested to Garfield Barwick, the Attorney General, 
over the composition of the Committee. PEN complained in 1959 of 
the exclusion from the Committee of authors’ representatives, and the 
Journalists’ Association argued that the composition of the Committee 
reflected bias towards publishers. But PEN and the Journalists’ 
Association themselves represented sectional interests: the real mischief 
in the Government’s selection of Committee members was not that 
one interest group or another was excluded but that no voice of 
detachment could be heard. 
The problem was not one of bias but the possibility that the leadership 
of two judicial officers would result in stultifying legalism rather than 
independent analysis. Copyright policy development cried out for more 
than the elaboration of precedent and legal principle, but in vain.  
Neither Spicer nor Dean possessed the liberal intellect necessary to 
point out – as Symon or Keating might have done 50 years previously – 
the accumulating contradictions in copyright policy.  
Their legalism produced the formula that lies at the heart of modern 
copyright policy: the notion that the aim of copyright policy is, as the 
Spicer Report stated, “balancing the interests of the copyright owner 
with those of copyright users and the general public”. For today’s 
policy makers, the idea that legislators must balance competing  
interests is self-evident and also historically validated. They take for 
granted the false idea that legislators throughout the history of 
copyright law-making have tried to create such a balance private and 
public interests.  
Spicer and his colleagues seemed unaware that in enunciating the 
balance theory they were advancing a novel idea. They paid little heed 
to the motivations and concerns of past legislators, reflecting the 
outlook of all subsequent policymakers and legislators, none of whom 
paid more than superficial attention to the history of copyright  
law-making. Carelessness about the past pointed to the fundamental 
weakness of the 1950s copyright committees. They analysed laws  
by reference to present demands and paid little attention to rationales, 
                                                                                                           
judicial duties with chairing the copyright committee unless he received staff 
assistance. For this reason, the Government chose Spicer as chair and invited Dean 
to join the Committee as an ordinary member.  
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experiences or conditions that explained how copyright laws came  
into existence.  
The copyright balance and the notion of public interest 
Today, policymakers seem universally to accept that the public interest 
is protected in legislation by the fair dealing, library and educational 
provisions. These provisions are said to “balance” the exclusive rights 
of copyright owners. Yet legislators who passed copyright laws in the 
19th and early 20th centuries did not refer to the balance of interests. 
They sought to defend authors against piracy and later created exclusive 
rights that extended their control over the production and use of 
copyright material.  
The idea of a public interest in copyright policymaking only arose when 
a portion of the public realised that copyright owners could – and did – 
demand payment for the public performance of music. The same 
public quickly realised that payment of licence fees whetted the 
appetites of copyright owners and their representatives: they seemed 
never to cease wanting more revenue from more sources. In the 1930s, 
the demands for revenue were driven by organised interests in Britain 
and Australia, namely associations of composers and music publishers. 
Then the record companies began to levy performance fees.  
Users faced two choices: pay fees or flout the copyright law. They 
usually paid.  
Users, private as well as commercial, discovered that proprietary rights 
opened the way to more and more controls over the use and 
dissemination of copyright material. Many protested loudly. 
Policymakers, beset by the louder demands of copyright owners and 
prospective owners, now felt the undertow of public resentment. As 
politicians discovered after collecting societies licensed the public 
performance of music, demands for payment sometimes evoked strong 
reactions. In the 1950s, a new generation of politicians came to 
understand that the ambitions of copyright owners and claimants, if 
realised, could alienate their greater constituency – the public. In 
articulating the principle of “copyright balance” the Spicer Committee 
expressed the politicians’ new-found pragmatism.  
The Committee failed to understand that the authors’ rights movement 
subverted traditional conceptions about copyright law. Only in 1911, 
when common law ideas of fair dealing crept into British statutory law 
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did the notion of separation between the private and public interest 
strongly emerge in copyright discourse.  
Before then, copyright consisted of a limited set of rights directed 
against piracy that, with the exception of the import provisions, only 
slightly restricted the public’s freedom to deal liberally with literary or 
other works. Far from balancing rights, legislation assumed that 
copyright privileges did not curtail the public’s freedom to enjoy 
literature, art and music. 
By devising the principle that copyright policy must balance public and 
private interests, as if the two were equal, the Spicer Committee 
ensured for the private interest a dominant position in future copyright 
legislation. The Committee seemed to implicitly suggest what the early 
legislators never contemplated: that gratuitous access to copyright 
material is a privilege to be granted by the legislature on narrow terms.8  
It is also possible that the Committee intended its formulation to limit 
the ambitions of copyright owners. Copyright legislation began as a 
limited statement of private rights and each restatement increased the 
scope of private rights. The Spicer Committee may have calculated  
that only statutory recognition of the public interest could stem the 
headlong rush towards ever more radical legislative statements of 
private entitlement.  
Perhaps. What is most striking about both copyright committees is that 
their findings confirmed once and for all that the industrial interest 
ruled copyright policy. By encouraging legislators to create proprietary 
rights in the output of industrial producers and disseminators, they 
smoothed the way to the systematic re-ordering of British and 
Australian legislation. The process of reform that began with the 
Gregory Committee created the categories, structure and language of 
contemporary copyright law. 
 
                                                     
8 It is true that publishers seeking monopoly privilege instigated the Statute of Anne 
and private interest and lobbying was at the heart of most British copyright 
legislation (the first copyright statute of Australia, by contrast, was prepared 
without reference to private interests). What is unquestionable, though, is that 
government always envisaged a limited scope for copyright privileges and saw 
outlawing piracy–that is, unauthorised reproduction for a commercial purpose – as 
the essential object of legislation.  
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The Brussels Conference  
At the close of the Rome Revision Conference of 1928, when delegates 
felt stronger intimations of dissent from the dogma of authors’ rights, 
the members of the Berne Union agreed to meet again in Brussels. The 
Brussels Conference, scheduled for 1935 and postponed till 1936, 
eventually took place in 1948. The years of delay did nothing to dim the 
enthusiasm of civil law countries for authors’ rights, but now they faced 
a Rubicon: should they maintain the doctrine of the creator’s unique 
entitlement or cross the river to accommodate the dissenters? 
They chose to conserve their gains. The shouts of industry 
representatives thronging the opposite bank went unheeded. Delegates 
did not actively oppose the record companies and broadcasters but they 
made clear they that they would not endorse the new concept of 
“neighbouring rights” – the putative rights of producers analogous to 
those enjoyed by the authors of works. Instead, they agreed, among 
other things, to broaden the exclusive right of authors to permit the 
televising of works, and their retransmission, as well as the public 
communication of retransmissions and their fixation after transmission.  
Members were permitted to determine the conditions under which the 
rights could be exercised. Delegates also agreed on changes to clarify 
that the Berne Convention itself extended protection to the public 
performance of works. Britain, joined by a number of countries 
including Australia, declared a reservation, insisting that national 
legislatures must be allowed to pass laws to prevent copyright owners 
from abusing public performance rights. 
The industries realised they must look elsewhere for recognition of 
neighbouring rights. But they secured one significant concession at the 
Brussels Revision Conference. Delegates resolved that members  
should try to study how copyright protection could be extended 
uniformly to sound recordings, broadcasts and performers. 
International cooperation and collaborative studies led to the creation, 
in 1961, of the International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 
– the Rome Convention.  
The willingness to examine ways to recognise neighbouring rights 
pointed to a truth that the Union delegates could hardly countenance. 
The claims of the recording and broadcasting industries could be 
parried but only for so long. Put to politicians, their arguments would 
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disarm opposition for they created what most governments revere – 
wealth, employment and influence.  
Neighbouring rights 
The neighbouring rights movement conveniently created formulations 
that government committees could understand and legislators adopt. 
The movement grew from attempts in civil law countries to ally the 
idea of copyright as a personal moral entitlement to the creation of 
copyright in sound recordings. How, asked civil lawyers, could 
copyright, the personal possession of a human creator, apply also to an 
impersonal entity, such as a record company? The answer they gave 
was that copyright did not apply to any person or entity that did not 
create works. However, those who performed, fixed and disseminated 
copyright works possessed related rights, or neighbouring rights, as the 
French called them. 
In 1936, Austria passed legislation that created the “related rights” of 
performers, producers of sound recordings and film recordings, and 
broadcasters. Italy followed suit in 1941 and the Scandinavian nations 
in the 1960s. In 1961, the United International Bureau for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property, UNESCO and the International 
Labour Organisation, jointly inaugurated the Rome Convention. Signed 
by 40 States it protected performers against unauthorised fixation or 
broadcasting of their performances.  
Record producers received the right to authorise or prevent 
unauthorised direct or indirect reproduction of phonograms and 
broadcasters’ rights of authorisation or prohibition in relation to 
rebroadcasts, recordings and fees. More protection followed. The 
Phonograms Convention of 1971, instigated by the music industry, and 
created with the authority of WIPO and UNESCO, required members 
to prohibit unauthorised reproduction, and importation of 
unauthorised reproductions for distribution to the public.  
The drafters of the Rome Convention drew on the concept of related 
or neighbouring rights and the drafters of the 1956 British Copyright Act 
would, in their turn, draw on Continental formulations to create the 
category of ‘subject matter other than works’.  
George Bernard Shaw’s last sally 
The nonagenarian George Bernard Shaw reintroduced the topic of 
copyright to public discourse in Britain in January 1949. In 1911, he 
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supplied an epitaph to authors’ rights when he wrote to The Times of the 
clash between “artists” and “industrialists”. “I suppose,” he said then 
of artists, “we must go to the wall”. Now, he could have said, “my 
warning has come to pass and we have gone to the wall”, for despite 
the benefits conferred on successful artists by copyright ownership, the 
great revenues of the copyright industries were not distributed to the 
advantage of most creators. But Shaw no longer protested about the 
evils of the gramophone industry. Though he continued to agitate for 
his fellow artists, he now attacked taxation policy. 
He wrote to The Times to harangue the Labour Government for taxing 
the annual income of “professional authors, playwrights, composers, 
painters, publishers, theatre managers, music sellers, and picture 
dealers”. According to Shaw, since their income varied more than that 
of any gambler, they should be taxed each year on the annual average 
of twenty years’ income. Shaw articulated more clearly than anyone else 
the argument that the special hardship of the artistic vocation obliges 
government to specially protect artists. Towards the end of his letter, 
when he raised his old grievance against the finite duration of 
copyright, he asked, “[why] is property in our creations communised 
after less than two lifetimes, and that of simple distributors made 
perpetual? Why is property in turnips made eternal and absolute when 
property in ideas is temporary and conditional?” 
His own response is hardly likely to have won many converts to the 
idea of a 20 year average for taxing creators. “As well ask,” he said, 
“why the British people dread and hate intellect.” Predictably, the 
Government ignored Shaw’s suggestions for income tax reform, but he 
did win support in the same month from another writer, Charles 
Morgan as well as the Society of Authors. Other correspondents to The 
Times, including A A Milne, opposed him, but soon enough, 
correspondence on the subject died out. Shaw’s last sally on behalf of 
authors is symbolically important because it clarified, on the cusp of a 
new era, that after 40 years of legislation framed to advance the 
interests of authors, the creative interest was still, to borrow his 
description of 1911, “poor and insignificant”, still at the mercy of 
“industrialists [who] are rich and can bully Governments”. 
Shaw extolled a pipe dream, as did all the proponents of authors’ rights, 
who imagined that copyright protection could turn a vocation into a 
profession. Although he saw their plight clearly, Shaw seemed not to 
comprehend that the nature of their calling meant that artists as a class 
could not expect any more from government than the supposed 
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windfall delivered by the Act of 1911. The analogy he drew between 
writing and gambling was apt. As he said, artists “live by gambling in 
values more desperately uncertain than the chances of any starter in a 
horse or dog race”. 
As he went on to say, no “turf book-maker would budget for such 
odds.” Yet the supply of would-be artists would never dry out and 
Shaw knew why: “the few occasional winnings are so great, and the 
prestige and eminence they confer so ardently desired that punters are 
never lacking.” What Shaw seemed unwilling to accept is that most 
artists offer little that is useful to governments and so are ignored. But 
authors – or, as Shaw would have said, publishers – had reason to bless 
government. Thanks to the efforts of the Berne Union, governments 
around the world made the gift of authors’ rights. Yet even by 1949 it 
was clear that copyright policy involved the regulation of industries, 
and the demands of those industries, not authors, commanded official 
attention. 
The Government stirs 
The first sign that the British Labour Government intended to reform 
the copyright law came a few months after the correspondence over 
Shaw’s tax proposal. In July 1949, Harold Wilson, the President of the 
Board of Trade, announced in the House of Commons that ratification 
of the Brussels Convention required amendment to the copyright law. 
He went on to say that he was considering the advisability of a “general 
inquiry into its working”. Public performance rights, the harbingers of 
commercial warfare in Australia and Britain before the War, remained 
the greatest concern of regulators. Wilson told the Commons that the 
“question whether there is any abuse in the exercise of the exclusive 
rights of public performance of musical works in this country such as 
would justify legislation is one of the matters which could be dealt with 
in such inquiry.” 
By mentioning performing rights, Wilson hoped to placate the many 
businesses aggrieved at the tactics of music collecting societies. The 
British collecting societies – the Performing Rights Society, which 
collected performance fees for composers, lyricists and publishers, and 
Phonographic Performance Ltd, which collected fees for record 
companies – were separately accused of the arbitrary determination of 
rates and the withholding of licences to play music. 
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The battles played out in Britain in the 1930s over performing rights 
continued, as they did in Australia, in continuing arguments over 
licence fees. By the late 1940s, matters were coming to a head. The 
users of commercial music (such as the BBC) had argued over 
conditions of licensing for over two decades. Users, broadcasters 
especially, were still incensed by the newer requirement to pay for the 
public performance of records. They still resented copyright collecting 
societies but they had come to accept them as permanent evils that 
could not be avoided.  
In Britain, new forces were emerging that presented politicians with 
new challenges. The BBC now also broadcast television programs to 
the nation. Television promised to bring sporting events to mass 
audiences. The BBC could only televise sport with the consent of 
sporting associations and the owners of sporting venues and now 
engaged in a tug of war over broadcasting rights. The broadcaster knew 
that millions watched and craved sport on television. The associations 
and owners knew that control over the staging of sporting events 
meant extraordinary commercial bargaining power. They began to 
consider how to exercise their control to maximum advantage and 
decided to press for copyright in sporting spectacles. 
The BBC too saw the value of securing copyright in broadcasts. 
Creators, manufacturers and broadcasters emerged as distinct 
constituencies that government must account to in a way 
uncontemplated even in the 1930s, when the battles of the gramophone 
and radio industries commanded attention. It took the Gregory and 
Spicer Committees to resolve tensions, even if their solution was 
imperfect in the eyes of the interested parties. 
The performing right and sport 
Though Wilson singled out musical performing rights as the prime 
focus of the Board of Trade’s mooted inquiry into copyright in the 
early 1950s, the British Government realised that the public’s main 
interest lay in the direction of televised sport. The question of musical 
performance faded from public view and attention concentrated on the 
possibility of granting copyright in sporting spectacles (and, by 
association, in public performances generally).  
Sporting associations, which controlled the events coveted by the BBC, 
the nation’s only licensed broadcaster, were unwavering about the 
necessity for copyright in sporting performances. Within a year of 
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Shaw’s letter to The Times denouncing restrictions on authors’ 
copyright, they began a campaign to secure copyright in spectacles. By 
this time, they were involved in a wrangle with the BBC over the 
televising of sport. In 1949, the Beveridge Report on Broadcasting 
suggested that the Government legislate to permit the televising of 
sporting events irrespective of the objections of sporting associations. 
Emboldened, the BBC demanded the right to telecast events on its 
terms. The associations responded furiously.  
First, they formed the Association for the Protection of Copyright in 
Sports. The Association represented 94 sports organisations, including 
the Football Association, the Lawn Tennis Association, MCC, Amateur 
Athletic Association, the Rugby Football Union, the Greyhound Racing 
Association, the Professional Golfers Association and Epsom 
Racecourse. The Times reported that on 24 March 1950, the 
Association met to discuss a ban on the televising of all sporting events 
until the review of copyright law contemplated by Wilson. 
At the meeting, Kew Edwin Shelley, KC, legal counsel to the 
Performing Right Society stated his hope that within five years “sports 
promoters will have a complete copyright of any event which they 
organise.” He proposed that the holder of copyright, sports 
associations could grant the BBC a primary licence to broadcast events, 
and give “hotels, public houses, clubs, halls, institutes and factories” a 
secondary licence to play the broadcasts. Shelley supplied the 
Association with a breakdown of anticipated revenues from copyright 
licensing after five years. He projected total annual returns of £154,000, 
consisting of £10,000 from the BBC, £25,000 from hotels, £30,000 
from large clubs, £20,000 from public houses, £15,000 from halls, 
£2500 from cafes, £1500 from institutes and factories, and £50,000 
from cinemas. He calculated administration expenses, including legal 
and wages at £34,000, leaving £120,000 for distribution. These figures 
– miniscule when compared with the broadcasting fees paid today to 
some sports associations – clarified the commercial potential of 
televised sport.  
Adding to the clamour, the chairman of Wembley Stadium, Sir Arthur 
Elvin, supported the call for a ban on televised sport “unless some 
satisfactory undertaking is soon given to sporting promoters that their 
events will in due course be protected by copyright.” He told The Times 
that, “the promoters, with suitable safeguards, do no necessarily object 
to the domestic televising of certain of their events [but] they do object 
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to the televising of such events being exploited by outside interests for 
commercial purposes.”  
Francis Steward Gentle, vice-chairman of the Association,9 informed 
The Times that the “question has now reached a head and some solution 
must be worked out to the greatest good of for the greatest number – 
or rather the least harm for the few.” He pointed out that sports 
promoters had called for copyright in sporting spectacles for five years. 
According to Gentle, the common law right to refuse television crews 
entry to sports venues did not help the Association’s members. The 
BBC would not offer more than £250 for the right to televise games 
and other events. Television executives wanted sport televised and they 
wanted to secure rights at low cost. Gentle considered the BBC’s offer 
derisory when compared with the takings of the clubs and public 
houses that charged admission fees to patrons who came to watch 
events like the FA Cup Final. Even worse, Gentle said, television 
broadcasts affected gate receipts since many regular spectators now 
chose to watch events on television. 
 The Government could hardly ignore the publicity surrounding the 
Association for the Protection of Copyright in Sports. The Postmaster 
General, Ness Edwards, met Gentle in May and they discussed sports 
copyright with representatives of the BBC and the Radio Industry 
Council. Edwards gave little away, though he promised the Association 
that the Government would not issue commercial television licences 
without consulting the sports promoters. He told the Commons that 
while he wanted the promoters to agree to the BBC televising more 
sport, he also recognised that they “should have a reasonable safeguard 
of their legitimate interests.” 
Faced with repeated demands for copyright in sporting spectacles, the 
Labour Government still hesitated. In November 1950, Wilson told the 
Commons that an inquiry into copyright law remained “under 
consideration”. Then the continuing impasse over televised sport finally 
forced his hand. In April 1951, he announced the formation of a 
committee “to consider and report whether any, and if so what, 
changes are desirable in the law relating to copyright.” The  
Committee, originally chaired by Lord Reading, who soon resigned to 
take up his appointment as Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
                                                     
9 Gentle, a solicitor, was also the longtime Chairman and Managing Director of the 
Greyhound Racing Association Trust Ltd. 
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Affairs, included the first woman to sit on a copyright committee of 
inquiry, Miss B A Godwin. 
The Gregory Committee 
A philosophical transformation  
The pages of The Times between the announcement of the Gregory 
Committee in 1951 and the passing of the Copyright Act 1956 record 
intensive lobbying of government. One interest group after another 
declared in print its right to special government consideration. In 1911, 
before the passing of the Copyright Act, Parliament heard repeatedly 
from publishers and the record industry. Others made their voices 
heard but not as a chorus. In the 1950s, the scene changed.  
The march of technology, the growth of the recording and 
broadcasting industries and the activities of collecting societies meant 
that the politics and possibilities of copyright policy were now much 
more complex. 
The Gregory Committee began a transformation of British and 
Australian copyright law less by foresight than accident. Its members 
did not appear to comprehend the forces of economic and social 
emancipation that would soon recreate the entertainment industries in a 
form unimagined. Even so, they proposed changes to the law that 
facilitated the expansion and interconnection of the music, film, 
television, sport and broadcasting industries. In no small part, changes 
to the copyright law helped to usher in the age of rock and roll, 
celebrity and sports-obsessed television broadcasting.  
The industries that created the new age – television, radio, music and 
film – steered the Committee in their preferred direction. Their 
representatives most likely did not foresee the coming revolution in the 
content and delivery of mass entertainment. But they knew that 
copyright in recordings and broadcasts would allow existing businesses 
to entrench competitive advantages. Galvanised by the prospect of 
exclusive rights held for lengthy terms, they passionately argued the 
case for protecting industrial investment. 
The Gregory Committee listened sympathetically as they stated their 
position. In an era of reconstruction and growth, it was no surprise  
that a government committee should prove so receptive to the 
argument that investment and output deserved the protection of 
property rights. More surprisingly, the Gregory Committee chose to 
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boldly depart, though not in direct utterance, from the axiom that 
copyright law existed to protect the interests of authors. For the first 
time in copyright history, a government committee made the 
qualification for copyright protection a matter, plain and simple, of 
industrial economics. 
The Gregory Committee, and later the British legislature, put to one 
side the requirement of creative originality. They also put to one side 
the requirement that copyright subject matter subsist in works. They 
now judged that investment, labour and the control of technology 
entitled industries involved in the production and dissemination of 
works to benefit from copyright protection. As the Committee said in 
relation to broadcasting copyright:  
[T]he position of the BBC, as we see it, is not very different from that of a 
gramophone company or a film company. It assembles its own programmes and 
transmits them at considerable cost and skill … it seems to us nothing more than 
natural justice that it should be given the power to control any subsequent copying of 
these programmes by any means. 
The Committee did not dispense with existing principles and 
categories. But it did not let consideration of authors’ rights deter it 
from proposing extension of copyright protection to industries. The 
Gregory Report carefully articulated the view that all rights other than 
those accruing to authors of works were subsidiary rights of copyright. 
The Committee wanted the distinction between the primary rights of 
authors, and the neighbouring rights of the industries, made clear in 
legislation – hence the 1956 Act’s formulation of ‘subject matter other 
than works’. The Report said:  
[W]e regard the rights we recommend for broadcast programs or gramophone records 
as subsidiary to the primary rights of the composer and author of a copyright work 
reproduced by these technical means, and that performing rights in programmes or 
records should be without prejudice to that primary right … we recommend that this 
principle should be recognised in any future legislation … consideration should be 
given to the question whether rights of this kind should not be described by some term 
distinguishing them from copyright in its primary sense. 
Nevertheless the Gregory Committee cast the die in favour of the 
industries. The time of analogous copyright, the legal bedrock of the 
modern entertainment and communications industries, had arrived. 
The recognition in Britain of copyright in ‘subject matter other than 
works’ established a regulatory system that allowed the industries to 
defend and extend their turf. After the 1956 Copyright Act, the 
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copyright industries began in earnest to use property rights to control 
the reproduction and distribution of copyright material and to develop 
multiplying revenue streams.  
The sports promoters 
The Gregory Committee acknowledged the public importance of 
resolving controversy over the proposal for sporting copyright. Its 
report noted that the “inability of the BBC to come to terms with 
sports promoters in the field of television has largely overshadowed in 
public estimation the other copyright questions we have been 
considering.” During Committee hearings, the promoters took full 
advantage of the public’s interest and ensured the spotlight remained 
fixed on the issue of televised sport. 
Francis Gentle told the Committee in September 1951 that sports 
promoters were similar to authors, composers or playwrights. They too 
were creators, and their creations, the spectacles they organised, 
attracted large audiences. They, no less than authors, deserved 
protection from free-riding. Sir Arthur Elvin told the same hearing that 
copyright in spectacles would increase the frequency of sports 
broadcasts. Before promoters struck deals with any broadcasters, 
however, they demanded legal protection. “We want,” he said, “to get 
as many of our sports events as we can on the television screen, but we 
object to outside interests exploiting us.” 
According to Gentle, the sports associations could not rely on the laws 
of trespass to keep cameras away from grounds. Nothing in law 
prevented the BBC, if denied entry to sporting venues, from televising 
events using telephoto lens. As an example of the effect of televised 
sport on the population at large, he referred to a BBC broadcast of a 
boxing title fight. Fans, he said, streamed “round the streets looking for 
television aerials, and [paid] 2s 6d to go into private houses to view it.” 
Like the gramophone industry before the War, the sports promoters 
feared broadcasting. Just as the record companies decided that radio 
listeners would not buy records, the promoters reasoned that viewers 
glued to television screens would never want to enter a stadium again. 
Amateur associations also expressed alarm. E H L Clynes of the 
Amateur Athletic Association complained to the Gregory Committee 
that “our work for many years has been retarded because of lack of 
finance.” He warned that, “if there is going to be still more television 
our income is going to drop.”  
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The associations were straightforward about their aims. Encouraged by 
Kew Shelley, chief counsel to the Performing Right Society, they hoped 
to secure a species of performing right that would allow the PRS to 
collect public performance fees on their behalf. But they could not 
overcome the theoretical difficulties raised by the Gregory Committee. 
As the Committee pointed out, the musical and mechanical 
performance rights applied to works and recordings that were already 
fixed. Collecting societies levied fees for the public performance of 
fixed, definable copyright subject matter.  
Sporting spectacles, broadcast via television, undoubtedly involved 
performance, but not of definable subject matter. They were 
constituted by the fluid actions of individuals. Faced with the demands 
of the sports promoters, the Gregory Committee could reasonably 
argue that existing principles would not allow the extension of 
copyright to what was indefinite. Strangely, though, the Committee 
looked more to precedent than principle when it opposed the grant of 
copyright in sporting performances:  
Copyright has never extended to a horse race or to a performance by an artiste or 
group of artistes, whether intended to be seen or heard, and we recommend that no 
such right be established. 
Perhaps equally strange, the Committee accepted that copyright should 
apply to the broadcasts of events or performances – strange because only 
by a stretch of the imagination can a broadcast transmission be said to 
“fixate” subject matter. Fixation really occurs as the transmission is 
recorded. This technicality did not inconvenience the Committee 
members, however. In their view, the industrial investment necessary to 
make broadcasting a reality supplied its own justification for the award 
of copyright (although they chose not to consider the argument that 
sports associations also committed expertise and investment to the 
development of stadiums and competitions). The report said: 
In the case of broadcast performance, we have recommended a right against the 
recording or unauthorized broadcasting of the performance transmitted … Labour, 
skill and money have all gone to the making of the broadcast or gramophone record 
and we can see no justification for leaving the results of this combination to piracy. 
 
The Association for the Protection of Sport in Copyright might more 
profitably have asked for copyright in broadcasts of events and the 
recordings of broadcasts. But the idea of copyright in broadcasts and 
recordings was itself a novelty, and the Association probably knew that 
 
269 
the Government would be unwilling to award broadcast copyright to 
an organisation other than the BBC. As the Gregory Committee said, a 
performer’s copyright would most likely create commercial chaos, with 
multiple performers or promoters demanding payment of licence fees 
for the privilege of recording, filming and broadcasting the show. 
Better, said the Committee, to vest the performing right in the one 
entity, the broadcaster, than leave broadcaster and performers to 
negotiate commercial agreements. Only by this means could the show 
go on. As the Committee observed: 
We are satisfied that only if the financial and other relations between the BBC and 
the Sports Associations and others are worked out on a voluntary basis will a 
sufficiently flexible scheme be produced. 
The sporting associations, and others arguing for performing rights 
could not – and did not try to – demonstrate that copyright in 
spectacles represented a logical outgrowth from the doctrine of 
authors’ rights. They could, however, assert that creativity, ingenuity, 
skill and investment were all manifest in the delivery of public 
spectacles and performances.  
 They could feel aggrieved that the Gregory Committee rejected the 
proposal yet supported the grant of copyright to recording companies, 
filmmakers and broadcasters on the grounds of investment and skill. 
Granted, the production of records and films involved the fixation of 
works. Yet, if, as most observers seemed to believe, copyright law 
existed to benefit authors, why allow copyright in sound recordings and 
films? After all, there was yet no such thing as “publishers’ copyright”. 
The music industry and performers 
The Gregory Committee devoted considerable attention to questions 
surrounding the performance of music. The first inquiry concerned an 
issue familiar in Australia. The Music Users’ Federation charged the 
Performing Right Society with licensing the public performance of 
music on unfair terms, and called for the creation of a copyright 
tribunal. Just as APRA in the 1930s opposed the creation of a copyright 
tribunal in Australia, the Performing Right Society fiercely rejected the 
possibility of a British tribunal. The PRS submitted to the Gregory 
Committee that, “no vestige of a case has been made out … that there 
has been any ‘abuse of monopoly power’.” 
The Committee then heard evidence of a battle between the record 
companies and performers. For several years, the record companies 
 
270 
and the Musicians’ Union jointly administered Phonographic 
Performance Ltd, the society that issued licences, and collected fees, for 
the public performance of records. The PPL, arguing that restrictions 
preserved the supply of studio performers, pursued a policy of 
withholding performance licences from venues that refused to employ 
performers to play live music. 
By 1951, the PPL’s policy, strongly supported by the Musicians’ Union, 
had become irksome to the recording industry. Once hostile to the 
unconstrained public performance of recorded music, the industry now 
adopted a permissive attitude. Record labels rejected arguments in 
favour of licensing restrictions and instructed the PPL to stop policing 
the hiring of musicians.  
Industry executives now believed that the public performance of music 
stimulated the increasingly voracious demand for records. The labels 
saw no benefit in refusing licences to maintain the supply of performers 
since demand for records ensured the continued supply of performers. 
Better, they argued, to freely issue performance licences – the more 
music played in public, the more money made. 
The Musicians’ Union reacted furiously. One Union representative, 
reported The Times, said musicians were not going “to play the music at 
their own funeral”. Musicians, he declared, wanted employment, and 
unless limits were placed on the public performance of music, 
opportunities for performers would dry up. Soon enough, the Union 
alleged, the ranks of performers would thin and those that  
remained would refuse to record music. The record companies were 
unmoved and insisted that the PPL must not refuse performance 
licences to clubs.  
Their change of heart pointed to an ironic reversal of attitude. In the 
1930s in both Britain and Australia, the recording industry attacked 
radio stations for supposedly broadcasting popular music continuously. 
Broadcasting, they argued, caused catastrophic declines in record sales. 
Now, armed with the common law mechanical performing right, the 
labels considered the public performance of music a blessing.  
Public performance actually boosted the sales of records and the more 
that users played records in public, the more the companies collected in 
performance fees. The Musicians’ Union could not hope to win its 
battle with the record companies. Sure enough, the Gregory Committee 
rejected arguments in favour of restrictive licensing and its report 
criticised the PPL’s restrictive approach to licensing. 
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Though the Committee showed little sympathy for performers, 
musicians did not give up. The composers organised themselves to 
press other matters before Parliament and the public. They wrote to 
The Times and lobbied legislators, on their own behalf and through the 
offices of the Performing Rights Society. They asked for repeal of the 
compulsory recording licence, the exemption of the BBC from paying 
fees for broadcasting music and the exemption of diffusion service 
providers from paying fees for relaying broadcasts.  
During the debates over the Copyright Bill in 1956, 397 petitioners 
signed a memorandum to Parliament and letter writers included a 
multitude of famous names: Vaughan Williams, Compton Mackenzie, 
Benjamin Britten, Arthur Bliss and Eric Coates. A larger group of 
signatories petitioned Parliament on behalf of the Performing Right 
Society. To no avail. In the contest for political favour, the recording 
industry crushed the Music Union and the PRS.  
The longstanding advocates of the performing right made way before 
the irresistible force – the new copyright compact that gave preference 
to the demands of industries. In 1911, George Bernard Shaw wrote of 
the leaders of the recording industry: “They, being industrialists, are 
rich and can bully Governments.” Whether or not the industry bullied 
governments, in 1956 it defeated its opponents more comprehensively 
than in 1911, when Bernard Shaw protested the introduction of the 
compulsory recording licence.  
Manufacturers copyright and the mechanical performing 
right 
After skirmishing with the musicians, the record companies went on 
the attack. Their industry association, the British Phonographic 
Industry, told the Gregory Committee that the demands of the film and 
broadcasting industries “transformed” the “whole situation” of the 
recording industry. The BPI made clear that if the Government 
recognised distinct copyrights in films and broadcasts, it must also 
grant copyrights to the oldest of this trio of industries.  
A compulsory licence to make records no longer sufficed. The industry 
demanded positive rights. To add to the negative right to prohibit the 
reproduction of recordings, manufacturers now demanded rights to 
authorise broadcasts and the public performance of records. The BPI 
pointed out that radio stations, film soundtracks and places of public 
entertainment used sound recordings. An expanded copyright that 
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allowed the industry to control the performance of records confirmed a 
common law right and fairly recognised the investment and expertise 
that made the production of records possible. 
Composers and the Performing Right Society opposed arguments for 
the mechanical performance right out of economic self-interest. They 
feared that once record companies were permitted to collect income 
for public performance, the BBC would cavil at paying dual 
performance fees. The worst result, they felt, would be that the BBC, 
and future independent broadcasters, insisted on paying lower fees to 
both. To the PRS, and those for whom it collected fees, the mechanical 
performance right represented a threat to revenue.  
The BBC opposed the mechanical right for the opposite reason. Its 
executives first expressed alarm at the prospect of paying two fees in 
1930, when the gramophone industry declared its right to prohibit the 
broadcasting of music. Twenty years later, the BBC feared overpayment 
as much as the PRS feared underpayment. The authors’ rights 
proponents also forcefully opposed an enlarged copyright in 
recordings. They wanted abolition of the compulsory licence and by 
analogy the extinguishing of a copyright in records.  
After listening to lengthy arguments, the Gregory Committee eventually 
gave way to the recording industry. It did so because, as its report 
noted, compulsory licensing provisions were, “the law of the land for 
forty years”. As the report said, during that time “trade interests have grown 
up” [italics added]. The Committee did not intend to disturb those trade 
interests. It reported blandly that, “we do not feel that a sufficiently 
strong case has been made out for making a fundamental change now”. 
The Spicer Committee repeated this endorsement, though both 
committees damned the compulsory licence with faint praise.  
Its longevity, they said, justified its continuance. In principle, neither 
committee supported an exception to authors’ rights that was  
nakedly economic in function. By contrast, neighbouring rights were 
supportable in principle because they conferred a distinct benefit and 
did not directly undermine the author’s exclusive rights. Each 
committee decided that abolition of the exception would be 
economically more unjust than retention. Retention of the  
compulsory licence pointed the way to support for extended copyright 
in sound recordings. Again, the industrial interest trumped the 
individual private interest. 
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Endorsement of the Brussels Conference amendments 
The Gregory Committee’s terms of reference required that it pay 
“particular regard” to the effect of the amendments agreed at the 
Brussels Revision Conference. The Committee reported on the 
amended Convention in six paragraphs dominated by platitudes that 
supported an inevitable conclusion. “Our general attitude”, the report 
said, “is that we are strongly of the opinion that Her Majesty’s 
Government should accede to the latest text.”  
The reasons were simple: 
We have indicated our appreciation of the high standards of the Union. We believe 
that is in the interests alike of the general public and of authors, composers and 
artists, that the rights of the latter in the works of their brain should not merely 
enjoy protection in the country of origin, but also that wider protection to be gained 
only in association with other countries … There are of course trade interests … We 
believe that this trade, based on the interchange of ideas between countries, is one 
which is important entirely beyond its value in money. 
The brief treatment of the Brussels amendments suggested that the 
Committee wanted to fry bigger fish. The amended Convention it 
considered important, so far as it went, but it offered no theoretical 
solution to the problem that brought the Committee into existence: the 
impasse between the sporting promoters and the BBC. Their dispute 
captured the public’s attention because millions of television viewers 
demanded televised sport. Refinements in authors’ rights could be 
considered and approved without great difficulty. The argument over 
broadcasting copyright alarmed the Government and every day 
provoked the ire of voters.  
Everything else to be decided by the Gregory Committee followed 
from reconciling conflicting commercial interests to ensure that 
entertainment of all varieties could be shown on television.  
The difficulty confronting the Committee should not be 
underestimated. The most pressing issue confronting its members 
could be neatly distilled in one question – should copyright subsist in 
sporting spectacles? 
Copyright in broadcasts 
The Committee gave straightforward reasons for proposing that 
copyright subsist in the broadcasts of performances rather than 
performances themselves. Copyright law is intended to benefit the 
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creators of works. The criterion for copyright subsistence is reduction 
of the work to a material form. Performances are reducible to a 
material form (by recording) but they are not themselves works. In the 
case of drama or ballet, for example, they are interpretations of works. 
Broadcasts, on the other hand, like sound recordings or films, provide 
the means for transmitting and fixating works. They are not mere 
interpretations, but the means of translating works into a form that can 
be appreciated by an audience. 
So far as broadcasts were concerned, the weakness in the Committee’s 
reasoning lay in the fact that many broadcasts are concerned with 
spectacles – “performances” – not works, meaning that in many 
instances of broadcasting, the supposedly essential connection between 
authorship and material fixation does not exist. The Committee did not 
stop to consider this break in the chain of its logic. Instead, it clinched 
the argument in favour of broadcast copyright by drawing an analogy 
between broadcasters and the makers of records and films:  
The position of the BBC, as we see it, is not in principle, very different from that of 
a gramophone company or film company. It assembles its own programmes and 
transmits them at considerable cost and skill. When using copyright material it pays 
the copyright owner, and it seems to us nothing more than natural justice that it 
should be given the power to control any subsequent copying of these programmes by 
any means. 
While sports promoters might claim that they wished to protect the 
products of their skill and investment, the Committee found a 
compelling reason, apart from the transient nature of performances,  
for rejecting copyright in sporting spectacles. If copyright applied  
to sporting performances, then, in principle, it must apply to all 
performances, with the result that a multiplicity of licence fees  
could be demanded for broadcasting a spectacle involving a number  
of performers. 
In its report, the Committee declared itself “convinced” that if public 
performance were copyright, “before long, there would grow up 
around the public performance of television a thick hedge of licences 
which would be required from many associations of copyright owners 
(as well as from individuals) with inevitable complaints and confusion 
in the minds of the public.”  
So broadcasts were to join sound recordings and cinematograph films 
as copyright subject matter, even though, unlike records and films, they 
involved the transmission, rather than fixation, of works. The report 
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recommended that broadcasters enjoy the right to prevent the 
unauthorised reuse of broadcasts, either by rebroadcasting, or by the 
making of records for sale and subsequent performance. The positive 
right to authorise the broadcasting of a work accrued to the owner of 
the work. 
By recommending broadcast copyright, the Gregory Committee 
materially aided the growth of the developing television industry. The 
BBC, for the time being the exclusive holder of broadcast copyright, 
had won its copyright battle with sports promoters. But it knew that it 
would have to strike contractual bargains with the all the suppliers of 
television content.  
In the case of some sporting associations, television broadcasting, far 
from destroying audiences at sporting venues, delivered television 
audiences of millions and eventually hundreds of millions, and poured 
undreamt of sums into their coffers. On the cusp of a new world, the 
BBC and sports associations continued to fight over rights of access 
and the broadcasting of events. Within a decade, their conceptions 
about the value of sports broadcasting were changed beyond reckoning.  
In the meantime, they inched blindly towards accommodation. The 
Committee’s seminal recommendation resulted, four years later, in 
copyright in broadcasts. But the Committee also proposed other far-
reaching changes that eventually helped to reshape the copyright world. 
Copyright term 
The Gregory Committee accepted that Britain’s ratification of the 
Berne Convention as recently amended would require abolition of 
legislative provisions that compelled copyright owners to permit 
reproduction of works after elapse of half of the posthumous term. It 
also insisted that the 50 year posthumous term for works must remain 
undisturbed. When it came to propose the period of copyright in 
recordings and films, the Committee settled on a subsistence period of 
25 years from production. The reasons it gave for proposing a 25 year 
term pointed to a shift in official thinking. 
The new approach, less sacerdotal and more blunt, slowly entrenched 
the idea that as the copyright industries generated more and more 
revenue, so they deserved more and more legal protection. Even 
though, applied to the question of copyright subsistence, it resulted in a 
recommendation that did not please the industries, they had reason to 
take heart. They could, and in 1956 did, influence legislators to adopt a 
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50 year term. And they could celebrate the fact that even the inferior 
period proposed by the Gregory Committee offered a significant 
benefit to film and record producers. 
Though the Committee sought an “empirical” solution to the question 
of how long copyright in films and sound recordings should subsist,  
it settled arbitrarily on a period of 25 years from production.  
However, its reasons revealed a willingness – apparent throughout  
its report – to substitute for traditional arguments about moral 
entitlement declarations about business investment and the 
expectations of business.  
The Committee made clear its opinion that authors, the primary 
beneficiaries of copyright protection, must always receive legislative 
benefits superior to those conferred on the industries, the prospective 
holders of analogous copyrights. But it also intended that the industries’ 
copyright confer real economic benefits. The arguments in the report, 
though, were ambiguous and confused. It the end, the Committee 
wrote simply that:  
We are by no means satisfied that a term of 50 years’ protection is justified for either 
a gramophone record or a cinematograph film, and we consider that this period gives 
them an excessive period of protection in comparison with other articles produced 
commercially. We accordingly recommend that the period of protection should be 
reduced to one of 25 years. 
Fair dealing, publishers, libraries, Crown copyright and 
the Tribunal 
The Gregory Committee recommended that fair dealing for the 
purpose of criticism or review be added to the statutory list of fair 
dealings. In addition, it proposed legislative provisions that would 
permit libraries to copy, at the request of students or researchers, for 
the purpose of research or study, whole articles from periodicals. 
Subject to conditions, any fair dealing by a student would be regarded 
as done by a librarian acting on the student’s behalf. 
Publishers were vociferous in public debate as they were in 1911. In 
1951, they denied reducing royalties to preserve margins,10 renewed 
                                                     
10 In letters to the The Times (April 1951), S Curtis Brown and Stanley Unwin argued 
that rising production costs compelled publishers to either reduce the royalty paid 
to authors, or increase the price of books. According to Unwin, authors typically 
preferred a lower royalty and static prices on the basis that more books would be 
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their time-honoured attacks on statutory deposit, and demanded 
typography copyright protection. Their opponents of 1911, the 
libraries, organised themselves effectively for the first time. The Library 
Association made successful representations to the Committee 
concerning library copying of books and manuscripts, as well as the 
reproduction of journal articles.11  
The Committee proposed a modest extension to the ambit of the 
Crown copyright provision in the existing legislation. The 1911  
British Copyright Act vested in the Crown copyright in works 
produced by its employees, or under its direction or control. The 
original provision seems to have been inspired by the Treasury’s 
classification of government publications into seven categories.12 
Treasury decreed that the first four categories of works were issued for 
the use and information of the public and the last three for more 
restricted purposes.  
The Crown copyright provision formalised Crown ownership of these 
categories of works and enabled government to more efficiently control 
the dissemination of its output. The Committee’s report stated that the 
Crown should be empowered to reproduce copyright material relating 
to the equipment of the Armed Forces, and possibly also for civil 
defence and essential communication, “subject to compensation”. The 
1956 Act enlarged the Crown copyright provision and extended Crown 
ownership to unpublished works. 
The Committee next proposed a measure that promised to draw to a 
close the wars of the 1920s and 1930s: the introduction of a Copyright 
                                                                                                           
sold and total royalties would be greater. On the same day as Unwin, The Times 
published a letter from Alex Miller: he stated that discounting the royalty would 
only marginally offset the purported increased production costs – in short, unless 
publishers proposed to substantially discount their own margins to attack rising 
costs, the argument for a reduced royalty was a ruse.  
11 An illustration of the libraries’ willingness to engage in controversy came in 1956, 
when the Standing Conference of National and University Libraries protested in 
The Times against the requirement in the Copyright Bill to charge researchers the full 
cost of library reproduction. 
12 The categories were: (1) Reports of Select Committees and Royal Commissions 
(2) Statutory Papers laid before Parliamentary (3) Parliamentary Command Papers 
(4) Acts of Parliament (5) Official books (6) Literary or quasi-literary works (e.g. 
departmental journals, reports) (7) Charts and Ordnance Maps. Treasury Minute 28 
June 1912 said: “My Lords see no reason why such works – often produced at 
considerable cost – should be reproduced by private enterprise for the benefit of 
individual publishers.” 
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Tribunal to arbitrate disputes between the collecting societies and the 
“users” of copyright material, the persons or entities charged fees for 
the right to play sound and television broadcasts, and music, in public. 
The report recommended that wide-ranging powers be vested in the 
Tribunal, allowing it to rewrite the terms of licences, to compel the 
grant of a licence and to fix the annual fees charged for different classes 
of licence. The Tribunal was to consist of a number of Government 
appointees and be chaired by a judge, former judge, or senior barrister. 
